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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
IN TH.FJ MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF DALLAS BED:B,ORD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN
AS D. B. LEWIS, DECEASED.
LUCILLE PARKER, JACK HEIDT
and ROBERT GASTON,
Appellants,
vs.
ERNEST L. LEWIS,
Respondent.

Case No.
10719

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF'
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a contest between executors appointed at the
domicile and a brother of the decedent, a Utah resident,
Pach Reeking the probate in Utah of the foreign will of
trie decPdent and the appointment of the contesting party
as the representative of the estate for the purpose of
conducting ancillary proceedings in the State of Utah.

DISPOSITION TN LOWER COURT
rn1e los1:rr Court U(lmitted the will of the decedent

to probate as a foreign will, denied the petition of the
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executors who had be011 appointed as such at the domicile of the decedent and appointed the petitioning brother
as administrator with tlw will annexed for the conduct
of ancillary probate proceedings in the State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the order appointing
respondent brother as administrator with the will an.
nexed of the estate of the decedent and directing the
lower Court to enter an order appointing appellants as
executors under the ·will for the conduct of ancillary
proceedings in the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal here is somewhat confusing.
It consists of tbree files, namely (a) the pleadings file,
pages numbered 1 through 11, and 98 through 111, with
Exhibits 1, 3 and 4 attached, here designated as "R. ":
(b) the so-called Original File, which is the copy of the
will and the probate thereof authenticated by the Cali·
fornia Court, pages numbered 12 through 97, here des·
ignated as "Of."; and ( c) the Reporter's Transcript.
pages numbered 1 through 130, here designated as "Tr.''
No substantial issue of fact is involved, the questiolli
presented are essentially issues of law.
Dallas Bedford Levvis, herein termed the decedent
died a resident of the State of California, on April 23
1966, leaving an elaborate will dated December 7, 196~
which he had himself prepared. (Of. 13-33, Tr. 69)
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DPcrdent was a successful business man engaged
prirnaril_v in th(• operation of the Lewis Food Company.
'rlii~ compa11~7 pn~pares and markets pet foods under
the well-lrnowu name of "Dr. Ross Dog aud Cat Food."
(Of. B-3:3) Deced0nt had other property holdings in
( 'alifornia, Trlaho, Oregon, 'rennessee and Utah. (Tr. 4)
']'hr ndur of deeedent 's estate is in excess of $5,000,000.
(Of. J 2, SrJ)
The will did not name any executors as such, but
11am0c1 appellants Lucille Parker, Jack Heidt and Robert
Gaston to perform certain duties and enjoy certain
po-wt-rs in connection with the administration of decedent's estate and denominated these persons as "Trusters." (Of. 13-33)
On J\Iay 2, 1966, Lucille Parker filed a petition in
the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County, praying for the probate of the will, for interpretation of the same, for tlrsignation of executors thereunder,
or in the alternative for issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed. On the following day
RobPrt Gaston and Jack Heidt filed their petition for
J;rol>ate of the will. (Of. 87-88)
'I1hese petitions <:'.ame on regularly to be heard before the California Court on May 25, 1966. Respondent
.PJm(•st L. Lewis, who is a brother of the decedent,
)'(>(•rived notice of surh lwaring, engaged an attorney
;md appc•ared in person aml by attorney at the hearing.
(Of. 87-89)
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The California Court, upon hearing on the petitio111
entered an order dated May 25, 1966, that the decedent
died testate on April 25, 1966, a resident of the State
of California, leaving an estate therein, that the docu.
ment dated December 7, 1965, be admitted to probate
as the will of the decedent, that Lucille Parker, Rober1
Gaston and Jack Heidt were named as executors under
the will appointing said persons as executors and order.
ing that letters testamentary be issued to them upor
furnishing a corporate surety bond in the sum of fiYt
million dollars. (Of. 87-89)
On the same day, Parker, Gaston a.nd Heidt, here
under termed ''executors'' furnished a corporate suret)
bond in the sum of five million dollars (Of. 90) arn
letters testamentary were issued to them on May 2fj
1966. (Of. 96)

The property interests of decedent in the State ~
Utah consist of rights with respect to some seventee
thousand acres of mining properties in Millard an,
Beaver Counties, Utah, together with a small pla1 <
located thereon and miscellaneous machinery, equiJ
ment and personal property used in connection wil (
the operation of the plant and mining property. (R. l (
The decedent acquired his interest in this pro] 1
erty by reason of entering into a joint venture agre rJ
ment with Thomas N. Neale and Sulphurdale Minir a
Company, a Nevada corporation, under date of Mar1
23, 1961. Pursuant to the agreement, the property "11'1 0
to be operated under the joint venture name of "Sr 11

plrnrdale Chemical Uompany.'' Decedent was the managi11g joint vcnturor and was to be in charge of all
operntionR of the joint venture. In the event of the
death of a joint venturor, his executor or administrator
Rhould carry on in his place antl he subject to the oblig-a tions of the deceased joint venturor under the agreement. The interest of the decedent in the venture was
51 %. (FJxhihit 3 to R.)
Immediately following the death of the decedent,
reRpondent Ernest L. Lewis was instrumental in causing the Lewis Food Company to exercise an option to
purchas(~ from Neale and Sulphurdale Mining Company for $415,000 a 46.55% interest in the joint venture.
Under this transaction, respondent obtained from the
purchase price unknown to the executors, a payment of
$24,000. (Tr. 112)

,
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The joint venture has never proved to be profitable.
I11 order to keep this venture going, it was necessary
for the decedent or the :B..,ood Company to pour in excess
of $600,000 into the venture. (Tr. 49) This was accomplished, prior to decedent's death, by creating an aceouut into which the decedent or the Food Company
deposited funds 'vhich were withdrawn and charged to
the venture. Upon the death of the decedent, it was
uecessary to continue to pour money into the venture.
rrhe executors determined that this should be done by
arhai1cing money from the Food Company. Under this
proee(lure there was advanced to the venture the sum
of $8,5S6 between J\ pril 28 and June 30, 1966. Included
iu lhef'e ac1nrnces wa8 salary to respondent which was
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to be $650 per month, with an expense allowance of
$200 per mouth, one-half of which was to come from the
Food Company and the other half to be charged to the
joint venture. (Tr. 3f), 4:-n
Necessarily the only means of paymg the cost of
maintaining the joint venture property will be to cou.
tinually advance money for such purposes which, until
the property is sold, must come from the Food Company.
This Company during the pendency of the probate proceedings is under the direction and control of the executorn. The joint venture could, accordingly, be a substantial drain upon the funds of the estate. This the decedent recognized and accordingly made provision in
his will that the Utah property should be sold for casb
or traded for listed stocks within six months, if possible.
and if not sold by the executors within six months, the11
the property should he sold at public auction by profes
sional auctioneers identified in his will. (Will - page l
Of. 13)
Under date of .June 2, 1966, respondent Ernest L
Lewis filed in the District Court of Millard County
Utah, a petition for the appointment of himself as a11
cillary administrator with the will annexed of the estat,
of the decedent. The petition alleged that decedeu
died leaving a will which was duly admitted to probat'
on May 25, 1966, as hereinabove set forth. The pet!
tioner did not present with his petition a copy of th
will and the probate thereof duly authenticated as J'f
quired by the provisions of Section 75-3-23, U.C..1
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l!l:.1.'3, but alleged that such production would be made
;ii tlw hearing 011 his petition. (R. 1-3)

Hesporn1ent EJrncst L. Lewis was in touch with the
n•rffes1•Htativ<~s of the estate and in close contact with
t lH· proceediugs in California. On June 2, 1966, a confrrPnce was held between the executors and their counsel at which grnest Le-wis appeared with his attorney,
who mrnounced that Mr. Lewis had filed for ancillary
lettern of administration in the State of Utah. On the
same day, consideration was given to the appointment
of Utah counsPl, the names of certain recommended
uttorne)TS were obtained, and on June 5, at the meeting
of thc executors, employment of Utah counsel was authorized. On J unc 8, attorneys for various executors
came to Utah and employed Messrs. Crafts and Waddingham as counsel for the executors, who on June 9th
prepared and transmitted objections to the petition of
respondent and their own petition for the probate of
the will of decedent as a foreign ·will and for the issuance
to ex0cutors of letters testamentary. (Tr. 7-9) This was
filed ou June 14, 1966. (R. 4-11) Copy of the will and
the probate thereof <luly authenticated by the California
C'ourt was filed in support of the executors' petition.
(OL 12-96)
1

'I11ie two petitions came on for hearing before the

lower Court on July 29, 1966. The lower Court made
firn1i11g-s aud condusions that:
1. Ernest L. Lewis is a competent person

to he named as administrator with will annexed
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in this matter, and is in no way precluded from
so serving.
2. Lucille Parker, Jack Heidt and Robert
Gaston were named in the will as ''trustees'' but
not as executors, and hence as non-residents of
the state of Utah are incompetent to serve here.
3. However, it is immaterial whether they
were named as ''trustees'' or executors in the
will inasmuch as they did not petition this Court
within the 30 days required by Section 75-3-4
U.C.A. 1953. Further they did not show good
or any cause for the delay.
4. From the verified petition herein it appears the rental value of the real property in
Utah approximates $47,000 per year and the
value of the personal property approximates
$9,000. There was no dispute as to such figures.
5. The will was in all respects executed m
required by law, was admitted to probate in
California on M'ay 25, 1966 as appears from the
exemplified copies of the will and the Court pro·
ceedings there which have been filed in this Court
Pursuant to said findings and conclusions, the Cour1
ordered that the will of the decedent be admitted ti'
probate in Utah, that Ernest L. Lewis be appointee
administrator with the will annexed, that the objectiorn
of Parker, Heidt and Gaston be overruled and denied
and their pe,tition for appointment of themselves a:
executors be denied. (R. 98-104)
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
TH~ LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT APPELLANTS WERE NOT NAMED
AS EXJi}CUTORS UNDER THE WILL OF
rrHEl DECEDENT.

At the threshold of this argument we are confronted with the question of whether appellants are
named executors under the will of the decedent. If they
are not executors, they are disqualified from acting in
these ancillary pruceedings because they are nonresidents. If they are executors, their nonresidence does not
disqualify them. In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285
Pac. 299; In re Raat's Estate, 102 Utah 482, 132 P. 2d
136; In re Howard's Estate, 108 Utah 294, 159 P. 2d 586.

As shown by the fore going statement of facts, the
will of the decedent does not designate executors by
that term. The decedent employs the term "trustees."
This situation required judicial construction of the will
to determine whether the persons named as trustees
wc·re in law executors under the will. This the California Court undertook to do pursuant to the petition
of appellants. The California Court, upon a consideration of the provisions of the will hereinafter further
considered, held that appellants were named as executors
under the will and made the order for their appointnwnt. (OL 87-89) The Utah Court notwithstanding the
judgincnt. arnl determination theretofore made by the
(\llifornia Court at the domicile, held otherwise as
l1i->reinahove shown. In so doing, we submit the lower
Conrt erred.
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(a) The Order of the California Court Appointing Appellants as Executors Is Binding
Upon Respondent and the Lower Court.
The Utah trial court as indicated herein admits
the will of the decedent to probate on the record and
order of the California Court. The lower Court, however, undertakes to fragment the order of the California Court and while admitting the will to probate,
in effect strikes down the order of the California Cour\
in appointing appellants as executors thereunder. ThiR
the Utah Court may not properly do.
As herein shown, respondent Ernest L. Lewis ap·
peared in person and by attorney in the California proceedings in which that Court held that appellants were
named as exeeutors under the will and ordered their
appointment. Respondent was accordingly a party to
such proceedings and is bound thereby. He may nol
now bring those proceedings to the Utah Court as a
hasiR for the admission here of the foreign will of th~
decedent and avoid a portion of the judgment of tha!
Court pursuant to which appellants were appointed m
executors under the will of the decedent.
The foregoing controlling principle is announrec
and fixed in this jurisdiction by the landmark case 01
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 522, 37 L.RJ
N.S. 368. The decision of Barrette establishes in thi:
jurisdiction the proposition that where statutory notici
has been given, all persons who are interested in th
estate and in fact all the world are bound by all order
or decrees duly entered. Not only was responde11
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L. I ,l'\\'i,c.; g1ve11 11oti('e of the proceedings held
hdort• tlw California Court but he appeared and parti<'ipate<l thPr<'i11. lfo is accordingly bound by those proc-e0di11gs and emmot now object in ancillary proceedings
i11 LTtnli, to tlw result obtained iu the very proceedings
i11 \Yl1irl1 IH· participated. If respondent were dissatisfiC'd <with the result reached in California, his remedy
is hy appeal in the California Courhi. In order to test
the sonuduess of the foregoing principle one need only
<'OHsider for a moment the havoc which would result
from a co11trary rule. If the judgment of the California
Court can he assailed in Utah it can be assailed in every
other state i11 whirh the decedent held property. MoreovC"r, if the appointment made by the lower Court were
rwrmitted to stand, respondent might very well seek
refuge hehiud the Utah judgment and refuse to account
to the executors upon the ground that their appointment
in California was void. This demonsfrates the necessit~· of lrnving this question resolved at the domicile
and if attackerl there onl~' by appeal in the courts of
that state. He cannot in effect collaterally attack those
proceedings by the ancillary proceedings in the State
of Utah. The rule is stated in Bancroft, Probate Practirc, 2nd Eel., Vol. 1, Section 40, as follows:
I1~rnPst

''Where statutory notice has been given, all
who are interested in the estate, and, in fact,
all the world, are hound by all orders or decrees
dnlY entered. And surh notice, where the statute
so .provides, may be constructive and need not
he nehial.'' Citing nnmrrous cases including- California antli<witics arn1 Barrett I'. Whitney, supra.
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Moreover, respondent Ernest L. Lewis is bound by
the express provisions of Section 75-3-24, U.C.A. 1953,
as follows:
75-3-24. Hearing and proof. - If on the
hearing it appears upon the face of the record
that the will has been proved, allowed and admitted to probate in any other state or territory
of the United States, or in any foreign country,
and that it was executed according to the law of
the place in which the same was made, or in which
the testator was at the time domiciled, or in conformity with the laws of this state, it must be
admitted to probate and shall have the same
force and effect as a will first admitted to probate in this state, and letters testamentary or of
administration shall issue thereon.
The foregoing section is considered carefully rn
Bancroft, Probate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, under Section 145, where the following rule is laid down:
Under the federal constitution and statutes
governing the effect of judgments of one state
upon proper proof in another, probate in any
state must be considered as conclusive upon the
courts of any other in respect of every matter in
which it is conclusive in the state of original
probate. The original probate is thus conclusive
as to personalty everywhere upon all questions
of due execution, fraud, undue influence, an<l
other matters affecting the validity and formal
sufficiency of the will as the last will of the
particular decedent, save for such right to ap·
peal, move to set aside, or contest after probate
as may be given by such jurisdiction. And i!
the statute in another jurjsdirtion where the
will is subsequently offered for -probate as a
foreign will provides that a will made out ol
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tl1 <' t:it ate by une not domiciled therein is as valid
when cxeC'utcd according to the law of the place
in which it was made or in which the testator
was domiciled at the time as if made in conformity with <lumestic law, such statute, interpreted
in the light of the requirement of the federal
<'onstitution that full force and effect be given
judgmPnts from sister states, makes probate upon
the record of probate in the other state conclusive as to sufficiency of the will as a muniment
of title to domestic realty. The fact that a foreign
will is subject, in the jurisdiction of its original
probate, to attack or contest and to review on
appeal does not militate against its conclusiveness
in the jurisdiction of ancillary probate, unless
and until such attack or appeal is made or taken
in the original jurisdiction. Nor does such fact
warrant like attack or review in the ancillary
jurisdiction.

Specifically, the determination of the right to letters
testamentary is conclusive upon all parties who were
participants in and bound by the proceedings in which
that determination was made. This rule is stated in
Bancroft, Probate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, Section 276,
as follows:
The order granting letters adjudges of necessity the right of the person to whom they are
granted to such letters.
It is aC'cordingly clear that the determination of the
California Court on the question as to whether appellants were namerl as executors under the will of the
dececle11t and the order appointing them to this office
is eouelusiYe upon respondent and the lower Court here.
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(b) The Will Names Appellants as Executors.
Assuming arguendo that the Utah Court was not
bound by the order of the California Court appointing
appellants as executors, and that the Utah Court could
examine the will de uovo on this question can there be
any serious doubt that the California Court was right
in the determination which it made? "\Ve think not.

It appears that three sections of the Utah Code,
1953, a re involved here. They are respectively Sections
74-2-2, 74-2-24 and 74-3-17, which provide as follows:
74-2-2. Intention to be ascertained from
words of will. - In case of uncertainty arising
upon the face of a will as to the application of
any of its provisions, the testator's intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the will,
taking into view the circumstances under which
it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations.
74-2-24. Imperfect descriptions to be cor·
rected - Evidence admissible. - When, apply.
ing a will, it is found that there is an imperfect
description, or that no person or property exactly
answers the description, mistakes and omissiom
must he corrected, if the error appears from the
context of the will or from extrinsic evidence:
hut evidence of the declaratiorn; of the testator a~
to his intentions cannot he received.
74-~-17. Although not named executor, one
intended entitled to letters. - "\Vhere it appean
bv the terms of a will that it was the intentioTI
of the testator to commit the execution thereof
and the administrntion of his estate to any per·
son as executor, surh person, althoug-h not namrd
exerutor, is entitlrd to 10tters testamentary ir
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the same manner as if he had been named executor.
Of the foregoing Sections, 74-3-17 is controlling
ht>rc. rrhis Section is substantially the same as Section
40~ of tlie California Code. Historically, of course, our
prohate code was largely taken from that of California,
a)l(1 the construction of the California Courts should
br· given considerable weight in construing the Utah
Code provisions. In re Raat 's Estate, supra. The question here is simply whether the named persons are
('harged with the performance of the duties of executors. That they are designated "trustees" is not material.
The duties of an executor are essentially to marshal
the assets of the estate, pay the debts of the decedent
arnl the costs of administration and to sell such property
as may be necessary for these purposes, and then to
distribute the remainder of the estate to the parties
entitled thereto under the will. In a large estate such
as this, the payment of estate and inheritance taxes is
one of the most important duties of the executor, and
often necessitates the sale of property to do so. The
fnnctions of a trustee arise when the probate proceedi11gs as such have been completed. It is quite common
in large estates today to name the same person or persons as executors and trustees under the will, the reason
h0ing that thereby a continuity of control over the
estate property can he achieved. The persons so named
\\~onhl accordingly perform their duties as executors
until tlwse duties were discharged and thereafter per-

Hi

form their duties as trustees. The essential inquiry
should accordingly be directed to an examination of
the duties imposed upon appellants. If the appellants
are required to perform the duties of executors under
the will, they are named as such regardless of the term
employed to identify them.
An examination of certain of the provisions of the
will quite clearly demonstrate that the duties required
to be performed by appellants here were duties of executors. This is made clear by the following provisions:
Under Section Thirty-First at Page 14 of the will
(Of. 25) the following duties are imposed upon the
parties named :
For the purpose of carrying out the term
of this Will I shall appoint as trustees: my
niece, LUCILLE CASSO-PARKER as heaJ
trustee, ROBERT GASTON as attorney ano
co-trustee, and JACK HEIDT now of the Unio1
Bank of Los Angeles, as the third trustee, ano
CAROLYN M. ALEXANDER as an alternatiw
trustee. However, LUCILLE CASSO-PARKER
would have the right to replace ROBERT GAS
TON with or without cause, and hire any attorne;
that she secs fit and also to appoint any addi
tional co-trustee in case one of the others resignel
for anv reason. In the case of the death o:
LUCII~LF, CASSO-PARKER, then CAROLY~
M. ALEXANDER shall assume the responsibil
ities of trustee. In the case of the death or resir
nation of LUCILLE <:ASSO-P ARKER or CAF
OLYN l\L ALEXANDER, then JACK HEID~
wm assume the trusteeship.
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1'hc usual language for the appointment of an executor is substantially as follows: "I nominate and appoint as exf'cutor hereunder (the nanied person.)" The
J:wguage hereinabove employed is of the same import.
'I'lw duty of carrying out the terms of the will is certainly that of an executor. It may also be the duty of
a trustee if trusts are created but it is nonetheless the
duty of an executor.
The will provides for the sale of various parcels
of property under Paragraph First, Page 1 (Of. 13)
thereof as follows:
FIRST: Inasmuch as my mineral and mining holdings are substantial and somewhat complicated, and even though they may have considerable value, I would instruct my trustee or
trustees to attempt to sell them for cash or trade
for listed stocks at a reasonable or fair value,
if possible, within six (6) months. If they were
unable to find a satisfactory buyer for those
mineral properties within the six (6) month period, then I would instruct that such trustee or
trustees employ the Milton J. Wershow Company
or the David Weiss Company to offer the mineral property holdin:gs, namely Sulpherdale
Chemical Company, my interests in Nuclear Fuel
and Rare Metals for public auction, and sell them
at the best possible price that they would bring at
public auction; and that the auctioneer be instructed to publicize the sale to reach the greatest number of potential buyers. If the Milton
.T. \V rrshow Company or the David Weiss Company are no longer in business, a similar capable
or~rnnization mav be used for this purpose.
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rrhe sale> of these assets is quite clearly the functio11
of an executor especially where the sale is to be made
immediately.
The will in Paragraph Second, Page 2 (Of. unnum.
bered followi11g 1:q provides for the sale of property
for the purpose of payment of inheritance taxes as fo].
lows:
. . . If the total business could not be sold
at the minimum of three (3) times book value.
thfm I instruct my trustee or trustees to sell al
fair market value the properties owned by
LEvVIS FOOD COMPANY located at 817 Ea~t
18th Stred, and Charlotte and Soto Streets to
Chieago Street which is not now being used i1~
the business, both properties in the City ant!
County of Los Angeles, and other assets men
tioned, other tlrnn the LE"\VIS FOOD COMP ANT
itself and its propert~T located at 6700 Cherr;
A venue, North Long Beach, and that the revr
irn<> receiYed from these sales be used to pa:
the inheritance tax on my estate, if sufficient
If it is not sufficient and if possible, a long-tern
lo::rn should he ohtainecl on other assets of LEWn
FOOD COMP ANY that would liquidate the bnl
ance of the> inheritance tax, ...
One of the most arduous duties of an executor i
an estate of the size involved here will he the payme1
of Federal FJsta te Taxes. The performance of this clnl
is imprn;;ed by la\\· upon the executor. He cannot coD'
plete hi8 probate duties or gain his discharge until snc
taxes are pai(l.

1
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Tli;· ,,·ill, Paragraph Sixth, Page 5 (Of. 16) makes
pnl\-i siom; for partial distribution:

. . . Partial distribution, either of the divi(1rrnls of the operation or the sale of its assets
over and above the requirements for inheritance
tax may be made at the discretion of the trustee
or trustees so long as ample and sufficient funds
are rrtained to maintain the business operation
of the LFJ\VIS FOOD COMP ANY ....
Distribution whether partial or complete is a function of the exerutor.
Numerous trusts are created under the ·will of the
de<'edent. In none of these are all the executors named
as trustees. In each of these trusts Security First National Bank is IJamed as trustee, with an individual
(usually Lucille Parker) or individuals, as co-trustees.
(Of. 13-3:3) There is accordingly a separation of functiorn; and perso1111el between appellants as executors
and the parties charged with the duties of administering
the trusts.
The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates the
prnposition that appellants were named as executors,
1hat the California Court was correct in its construction and the lower Court erred.
( c) Property Involved Here Is Personalty
"\Vhich Is Controlled by the Law of the Domicile.
The foregoing argument under this Point I should
dispose of the question of whether appellants were
i1mn0l1 as cxeeutors under the will. This question is one
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which of 11eerssit!· must he determined at the inceptio1
of prohatr yH·occedings. The ownership of or distrihu
tion of property is not invoh·ed in that determi11atio1 1
The ge1wral rule is, however, that the validity and iu
terpretation of wills with respect to realty is governer
by the law of the situs and ·with respect to persona
property by the law of the domicile.
As herrin show11 Paragraph First of the will rt
quires the executors immediately to sell the Utah prop
ert!r or to trade the same for listed stocks, in othe
words to convert the same into personal property.
Section 74-2-22 of U.C.A., 1953 dealing with th
question of when realty is deemed personalty provide
as follows:
74-2-22. When realty deemed personalty. When a "ill directs the conversion of real pror
erty into money, such property and all its pri
ceeds must be deemed personal property fror
the time of the testator's death.
Section 74-~-21, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth the aho1
stated rule with respect to construction, as follows:
74-3-21. When law of locus and law of dom
cile governs. - Except as otherwise provide
the \'alidity and interpretation of wills are go
erned, when relating to real property within tl:
statr, by the law of this state; when relating
personal property, b~r the la"- of the testato1
domicile.
If the Utah property is regarded as realty it is <' 1'
vPrted into pNsonalty by the terms of the will and urnl
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foregoillg Sertion 74-3-21 the will with respect to
:·rneh property is controlled by the law of the domicile.
tlH'

-'\ s hereinabove shown, the rights of decedent in
t l1« 1 i tali property are basically controlled by the joint
\ 1·11turr agreement. Generally speaking, joint ventures
<11td partnerships are governed by the same rules of
law. F'orhes c. Butler, 66 Utah 373, 242 Pac. 950. Usually, in the case of the dissolution of a partnership, the
pro\'isions of Section 75-11-9 of our probate code apply,
pursuant to which the surviving partner has the obligat i1111 aud duty to wind up the affairs of the partnership
aml uecow1t to the representative of the deceased partuer. Respondent does not qualify for such duties bec;mHe he asserts and the lower Court found that he had
transferred his interest in the venture to his wife.
However, the matter of the operation and control of the
joint venture in the event of the death of a joint venturor
is expressly controlled by the provisions of paragraph
J .) tlwreof to the effect that:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of
and shall be binding upon the respective successors and heirs and assigns of the parties
hereto. In this respect, in the event of the death
of an individual joint venturor his executor or
administrator shall carry on in his place and
shall be subject to the obligations of said deceased
joint venturor under this contract until distribution anrl upon distribution the heir of said joint
v0nturor or the purchaser of the joint venturor's
iuten•Ht shall be subject to all of the terms and
eondiiions of this agreement.
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(Ex. :J, page ii, H.)
Control of the joint venture is placed in the ha11d.·
of the decedent urnlrr paragraph G of the joint ventun
agrePmeut \\ 11id1 provides as follows:
Contributions and duties of Lewis. Lewi,
shall he t11P managing joint venturor and wil
he in charge of all operations of the joint venturi
and shall utilize sound business principles in th,
management and operation of said joint venturi·

(Ex. 3, Page 3, R.)

Considering tlwse statutes, the provisions of tJr,
will and the joint 'l'entnre agreement, it is manifest tha
the control of tlie joint venture was intended to he i·
D. B. Ll'Wis and his executors. As herein shown, tl1
Food Company acquired an additional 46.55% intere·
in the joint venture immediately after the death of tl1
decedent. Inasmuch as the joint nmture had no fund
to operate and "'HS dependent in order to keep goin
upon funds heing supplied from outside sources, sm
proprrt~, should be controlled h~, the executors namf'
at the domicil<'. If thr matter were fragmented and i
the ancillary proeePdings an administrator with the wi ()
annexed wen' able to rontrol this property and mal <·
essential dPcisi011s i11 eonnection therewith, the unifi1 t
administration which is so essential in an estate of tl1
size ano romplexit~, "'ould he lost and substantial det1

ti

r:l'lw foregoi11g simply further demonstrates the 1 °1
scntial proposition that ihc appointment of the cxecu! cc
at the domieilP must h0 hi11<li11g upon the Utah Court. 11

23
POINT II.
'I 1 1IE LOWJ1JR COURT ERRED IN DENYING

rrIUJ l!TAII PErrITION OF THE EXECUrrORS UPON rrHE ASSERTED GROUND
rrnArr rrHE SAME WAS NOT FILED WITH1N rrIIIRTY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
rr HE lH~ATH OF THE DECEDENT.

As Jiereinabove shown, the Court concluded that
it was immaterial whether the appellants were named
as trustees or Pxecutors inasmuch as they did not petit io11 the Court \\'ithin the thirty days required by Section
/:J-:~A, U .C.A., 195:1.

In so l1oldi11g, we believe the Court was clearly in
Pl'J'Or.

(a) The California Petition Was Timely
Filed.
Decc><lent died on Monday, April 25, 1966. On the
following :Monday, May 2, 1966, the petition of appellant; Lucille Parker, was filed in the Superior Court
of Los A ngC'les County and on the following day the
pdition of tl1e other two appellants. No contention is
or ea11 he mad<> that the executors did not proceed in
compliance with California law in the timely filing of
their pc>titions.
rriw must cursory reading of this will demonstrates
that the instrument is a classic example of the attempt
of a WPfl lil1y hm;i11ess man to prepare an elaborate and
er 1 rnplieatt~d will without the aid of legal counsel. As
lH•11·i n :-;Jiow11, tl1e decedent did not use the term "exec-

24

uton;'' aml throughout the will employed the tern
"trustees." At the outf.;Pt it was necessary for the ap
pellants to have a legal determination made of thi
representative capacity in which they were authorizer
to act. Until that dPtennination was made, they bar
no power to act aR executors in California or any othe
jurisdiction. Upou a hearing of the petition, the Cali
fornia Court held on May 25, 1966, that petitioners wer.
named as executors under the will. On the very sam
day they furnished a corporate surety bond for fo
million dollars and signed their oaths as executor,
which was filed and letters testamentary issued on tL
following day. This was clearly most expeditious co;
duct. "\Vi thin the following week the respondent r1
turned to Utah, engaged counsel and filed his petitioi
HP asserts and the lower Court holds, that the exec
tors were required under Utah law to file their petitior
for ancillary proceedings in Utah on or prior to Ma
25, 1966.
1

(b) The Utah Petition Could Not Be Fih
Until the "'\Vill Was Admitted in California.
The provisions of Section 75-3-4, U.C.A., 1953, r
late to the duty of an executor in control of a will·
initiate proceedings at the domicile of the decedent. :
we have heretofore observed, the decedent died a re•
dent of California. Tn that jurisdiction the proceedin
were rommenced with the utmost expedition. The pi
ccedings in Utah involve the admission of a foreign"
to probate. "\Ve must accordingly look to our statute
ascertain the requirements of our law in this respe
which requires an examination of Sections 75_3.:
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and 75-8-24, U.C.A. 1953. Section 75-3-24 has
p hrret ofore hPen considered. The provisions of the other
two sect i0118 a re respectively as follows :
/;->-::-~:1

75-3-22. Foreign wills - May be admitted
to probate. - Wills duly proved and allowed in
auy other state or any territory of the United
r::Hates, or in any foreign country or state, may be
allowed and recorded in any county in which the
testator shall have left any estate.
75-3-~3. Proceedings on production. - When
a copy of such will and the probate thereof, duly
authenticated, shall be produced by any person
interested in the will with a petition for letters,
the same must be filed, and the court or clerk
must appoint a time for the hearing, of which
notice must be given as hereinbefore provided
for an original petition for the probate of a will.

r

"

Tl1e language of Section 75-3-23 is at the outset
rr controlling. From this section it is seen that ancillary
a proceedingH for admission of a foreign will require as a
C'ondition precedent, the proof of the will in another
jurisdiction. The party seeking to conduct ancillary proeerdingR under a foreign will cannot produce the origr inal will beeause this is lodged with the Court at the
domi('ile. He must await the outcome of proceedings
at the <lomicile hefore he can initiate the ancillary pro" e0edings because he is required to produce the copy of
1 the will and the probate thereof duly authenticated.
1 T!rn1cr the facts here, the executors could not have filed
r tlw rwtition iu Utah until the 26th of May, the day letters w<>n' i:;;~ued to them. This under the ruling of the
lower C011rt would he too late under the provisions of
1

To further clcmonstrate the rrror of the Court'
ruling, suppose that a rontest had arisen in Californi:
011 the admission of the will or the naming of the exe(
utors and this hntl tn ken a month to resolve. Durin
this period C'Ompliance could not have been had wit:
Section 7f:i-3-23 becaust> the required record could nv
be producrd. Could it seriously be contended that undf
such circumstanrrs Section 75-3-4 foreclosed the rig),
of the executors to conduct ancillary proceedings i

Utah.
(c) The Utah Petition Was Timely Filed.

1t is ac<'.ordingly necessary to construe the pror

sions of Section 7;}-3-4 in relation to the sections dealin
with foreign wills. The proper construction of all the!
sectiorn; is, we suhmit, that the thirty-day period pr
scribed under Sedion 75-3-4 does not begin to run 1
tl1e ease of a \Vill being admitted in a foreig-n jurisdi 1
tiou nntil thr orclL'l' has been enterc>d for the admissir
of that will to probate, and the naming of an execut
under tlw will. '\Vhe11 that has occurred, the penr
named as executor is in a position to proceed in cor
pliance with the foreign will statutes. Until that orrl
has heen issued the hands of the executor are tied a
llP cannot compl:· with the pro\'isions of Section 75-3-:
rrhis thr lower <'ourt faikd to recognize. Under ti
co11structiou the executors in filing their petition "; t
the Utah Court on .June 14, 1966, complied \\Tith i ''
s
rPquirenwnts of R0dion 75-~-4 because theY
. wf
within the thirty-da~' pNiod following the issuance
the California ord"r of Ma:T 25, 1966.
1

No lianlship ean result from the foregoing consiructi011 of Uwse statutes. If any necessity arose for
in:1mPdiate prnccedi11gs iu any estate in ancillary pro-

<'PC(lings in lJ tab, the assets can be protected under
tC>mponu·y atlministration.

No Utab dceision is contrary to the foregoing. In
n: Luce's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 Pac. 299, is not in
point here. Iu that case decedent Flora B. Love died
a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving a small
estate in this jurisdiction. This was the place of her
residencP and the situs of domiciliary proceedings. Ac1' cordingly, proceedings in her estate were necessarily
n commenced here. The executor was not under the nec11 essity of first having the will admitted in a foreign jurr, isclidion and then conducting ancillary proceedings in
! Utah in compliance with our statute relating to the adli mif-:sion of foreign wills. Accordingly, Section 75-3-4
,i11 applies aml the case was properly decided.
1

1
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POINT III.
EVF1N IF sgcTION 75-3-4 WERE APPLICABLE, GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAY WAS
RH OWN.

Assuming arguendo that the executors were under
tl
, thP m c0ssity of filing their petition in the Utah Court
W:
, within thirty days after decedent's death, they have
I
cause for delay.
w1 shown good
··
· The executors were confrnnte1l wilh the administration of a very large and
'€
· complieah d <~stah•. The principal asset of the estate
' ' c1:-c a \'<'!',\' profitable business in which the decedent
1

1

was engaged in the packaging and sale of pet food
This business and the conduct thereof required Yer
important and serious considerations on the part
the executors. l\foreover, there were properties locatf
in Oregon, Trlaho, Tennessee and Utah ''rhich requin
consideration and attention. (Tr. 68-77) With respe.
to the property locatrd in Utah, this was under tl
local management of respondent, the brother of dee
dent. He was deriving a salary from the local manag·
ment of this property and charged with the duty of i·
care, yet the executors were under the necessity ai
are now under the necessity of continually advanci1
money for the preservation and operation of the Utr
property. Moreover, at the instigation of the respo11i
ent, Ernest L. Lewis, the Food Company immedia!t
follo,•;ring the death of decedent was induced to pay o
$415,000 in purchase of the Neale and Sulphurda1e Mi
ing Compan~' interests in the Utah venture. (Tr. 32-J

1

The <>ntire period from the date of death of t
decedent until the filing of the application in Utah 11
less than two months. There is no intimation here tl:
the Utah property was in any manner prejudiced
impaired by this delay. The great urgency with resp1
to the affairs of the decedent was at the domicile
the decedent. There the most valuable asset, name
the Food Company, was located, and there must
generated the money with which to hold together!
property of the estate including the property of
joint venture. Had those affairs been neglected to·
detriment of the estate, the damage "-ould have h
incalculable.
1
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The decedent appears not to have reposed confi1 (knee in reHpondent, Ernest L. Lewis. Nothing was left
tu Ji im di redly under the will. A trust was created for
e Ernest L. Lewis, his wife and his son, but no responsif bility whatever was placed in the hands of Ernest in
ornie ct ion with the administration of the estate. The
e: C
l full responsibility for the affairs of the estate is lodged
ill the executors.
c'

This is a good example of the prejudice and uncertainty which would arise from depriving an estate of
l:
unified control. Here the executors were under the
11
necessity of continually pouring money into the propb
erty for the purpose of its preservation. The control
of 1he property should of necessity be lodged with the
same persons who are responsible for the expenditure
0
of the funds necessary for its operation and preservation.

111

11

)<

rrhe rule is well settled in Utah that upon a timely
application the Court has no discretion but to appoint
a qualified executor. In re Love's Estate, supra, p. 353.
N()r should the Court set aside the nomination of a
testator except upon compelling reasons, none of which
arP present here. The peculiar facts in this case and
the necessity for unified control over the Utah property
compel the appointment of the executors named by the
dceeuent.
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CONCLUSION
The order of the Court denying the petition of ti
executors should be reversed and the case remanded 1
the lower Conrt with direction to grant the petition 1
the executors and for the entry of an order appointit
them as executors for the conduct of ancillary proba1
proceedings in this jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
rrHORPE WADDINGHAM
DUDLEY CRAFTS
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